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Abstract
Boundaries can be seen as barriers or as places of contact. It has been suggested that we are ‘‘prisoners of borders’’,
of all kinds of borders (political, religious, social, cultural, linguistic etc.). While this statement appears to be
somewhat exaggerated, it holds some truth. Boundaries are elements in spatial organization, and they inﬂuence
daily life in many ways (not only for people living right along them). The paper addresses the question if we must
call ourselves ‘‘prisoners’’ or if we simply have to live with all kinds of borders. Departing from theoretical
observations, the paper discusses the various aspects boundaries assume in the European context before looking at a
few concrete Swiss examples. They reveal that even regions at a certain distance of the state border will feel its eﬀects
(the case of Zurich airport), but the most important beneﬁt can been drawn by people living in the border area itself
(through price diﬀerences between the two countries, as exempliﬁed by the Swiss-Italian border). There may be
asymmetry on state borders, but this asymmetry can also swing around: the advantages often lie on both sides. The
paper concludes by pointing to the persistence of the boundary concept. They are a necessity for the organization of
space and society, but they are not absolute. There are always holes in these prison walls, and the examples where
boundaries were impermeable are probably rare.
Introduction
The discussions about political boundaries have always
oscillated between two perspectives: they were seen
either as barriers or as places of contact (Mrohs and
Heukels, 1970), as obstacles or potentials. Marking the
edge of a state (of a political zone of inﬂuence) has been
their main function, and they continue to do so despite
many eﬀorts to overcome this separating role. Their
importance in the state-building process has been illus-
trated after the end of the Soviet Union and of Yugo-
slavia (see, for example, Hajdu´, 2004). Yet, the growing
global interdependence, based on internet and e-mail,
world trade, global capital ﬂows, and common social
and environmental problems suggest that boundaries
are doomed to disappear or at least to be considerably
weakened due to the necessity of transborder regional
cooperation (Lee and Bahrin, 1998). The creation of the
Schengen area inside the European Union, where border
controls have been eliminated, seems to highlight this
kind of process, which started just two generations ago.
Boundaries are conceived of as lines separating enti-
ties from each other. As such they create and refer to
discontinuities. Such entities can be states or provinces,
but also cultures, scientiﬁc ﬁelds, ways of thinking and
other domains – there is no reason to limit this term to
the political ﬁeld alone (as will be done hereafter).
Besides, apart for serving practical purposes, boundaries
also have a profound psychological signiﬁcance. It may
be described by the term territoriality, ‘‘a primary
geographical expression of social power’’ (Sack, 1986,
p. 5). The necessity to control and defend one’s sphere of
inﬂuence can probably be seen as archetypical in
the animal realm (including humans). Territories are
delimited by boundaries, which, therefore, act as ele-
ments of spatial diﬀerentiation. Depending on the degree
of separation, they can be felt as almost non-existent or
as a sort of prison wall, shutting a territory oﬀ from the
rest of the world. The Berlin Wall, the Iron Curtain, and
the US-Mexico border furnish the best-known examples
for this latter image.
The invitation to a conference on boundaries in
Europe (held in 2004) suggested that people could be
seen as prisoners of borders. This latter term was used in
a wide sense to include political, religious, social, cul-
tural, linguistic boundaries. However, ‘‘prisoners of
borders’’ is not the same as the border as a prison wall.
A prisoner is ﬁrst and foremost a person that for some
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reason or another has been conﬁned to a limited space (a
prison) and has restricted freedom of action. An exter-
nal authority, a tribunal, has decided upon this con-
ﬁnement. From a psychological perspective, however, a
prisoner is a person that is caught within a limited world
(the ego, the senses), within a restricted framework of
thinking, for example, who cannot go beyond his or her
limitations. This is a sort of internally decided conﬁne-
ment.
This perspective is illustrated by a saying attributed
to Albert Einstein: ‘‘A human being is part of a whole,
called by us the ’Universe,’ a part limited in time and
space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings
as something separated from the rest – a kind of optical
delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of
prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and
to aﬀection for a few persons nearest us. Our task must
be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our
circles of compassion to embrace all living creatures and
the whole of nature in its beauty’’ (http://www-gap.dcs.
st-and.uk). Humans are prisoners of their minds, and
Einstein demands them to break through such prison
walls.
The title of this contribution must therefore be
understood fromaﬁgurative perspective: humans become
prisoners once they are glued to a particular idea (a ste-
reotype) and do not see the alternatives around us – they
suﬀer from ‘‘monocultures of themind’’ (Shiva, 1993) and
cultivate ‘‘the TINA (there is no alternative) syndrome’’
(Shiva, 1996, p. 298). Persons who can only survive if they
receive precise directives are prisoners of regulations. By
writing down laws, a society creates rules of conduct that
can become a sort of prison unless they keep pace with the
dynamics of life. Individuals breaking these rules will
usually marginalize themselves; however, they can also
point the way to the expansion, re-interpretation or
development of such self-constructed prison walls.
A number of questions turn up at this point. Are we
prisoners of borders, and if yes, is this a negative fact?
Can boundaries and limits really be abolished? Are they
not a natural phenomenon humanity has to live with,
that does not only restrict but also oﬀers possibilities,
alternatives? Many boundaries have been torn down,
but new ones have been erected – it seems to be an
ongoing process. There is no such thing as a borderless
world; we have to live with all kinds of limitations and
restrictions such as are imposed on us by our own nat-
ure, the ecosystem, our role as zoon politikon, as social
beings in a human community within the ecosystem.
Whether such limitations are prison walls is a matter of
personal perception.
This essay looks at the prison deﬁned by political
boundaries whose walls have holes, indeed need holes.
The prison wall metaphor addresses the fact that bor-
ders (not only political but of all kind) are at the same
time inevitable and unwanted. This dichotomy is not
really a contradiction but rather the two sides of the
same medal. The focus will be on Europe, in particular
on Switzerland (an island in the European Union). This
country oﬀers a good example for this ambiguity,
because it is oscillating between participating in and
standing outside the EU project.
Theory and concepts
In order to provide a solid basis for the case studies
below, this section spells out the roles and eﬀects of
boundaries. In addition, it addresses the issue of border
typology and links it to the topic of border eﬀects.
The functions and eﬀects of boundaries
The study of boundaries has to depart from the roles
they assume, the border functions. In their pioneering
book, Guichonnet and Raﬀestin (1974, pp. 48–53) dis-
tinguish between ﬁve diﬀerent border functions:
1. The legal function: the border delimits the perimeter
of laws and regulations, and of the judiciary. It is
the circumference of the state territory where the
political system exercises authority. This function
would persist, even once all other functions had
disappeared (ibid., p. 50).
2. The ﬁscal function is an instrument of economic
policy, enabling the state to protect its economy
against foreign competition. The best-known aspect
is the duty, levied by the customs authorities. ‘‘This
function is at the origin of numerous indirect border
eﬀects’’ (ibid.). At the same time it is an important
source of income for the state.
3. The control function is destined to administer access
to a country. People and goods can be submitted to
simple checks or substantial scrutiny, depending on
the regime or a speciﬁc context. This function is a
policy instrument, concerning immigration (right of
access, health issues) and trade (quality and quan-
tity control), sometimes also on the transfer of
information (censorship) – it acts as a ﬁlter (ibid.,
p. 51).
4. The military function emphasizes the boundary’s
role in national defence. It is true that the strategic
situations and the new arms technology have
considerably weakened it, but it still maintains a
certain amount of relevance – border conﬂicts or
wars have not disappeared.
5. The ideological function has most prominently been
exempliﬁed by the Iron Curtain, but it can also be
detected in the everyday domain of schooling. Every
country is convinced of the supreme quality of its
school system, to go to school in the neighbouring
country (because the school is closer) is almost
impossible, at least as far as compulsory education
is concerned. The border thus plays an important
role in the building of national identity (Knippen-
berg and Markusse, 1999, p. 7).
In a dynamic world, these functions will not be static
but subject to constant change. They may eventually
disappear; more likely, however, they will be reduced in
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their eﬀect – the two authors call this process defunc-
tionalization.
Deﬁning boundaries obviously creates various
impacts on the landscape and the people. Again we have
to resort to Guichonnet and Raﬀestin (1974, p. 45 f.)
whose simple typology distinguishes between direct,
indirect, and induced eﬀects (for more details see Raﬀ-
estin et al. (1975, p. 12). Similarly to the functions, the
eﬀects are also of a dynamic nature.
Direct border eﬀects can be recognized in the doubling
of infrastructure and industry investments. Schools,
health institutions, bank and insurance oﬃces are subject
to national legislation; roads and railways are of national
strategic importance (both economically and militarily).
Industrial investment may be necessary to gain market
access over an excessive ﬁscal function. To overcome
such direct eﬀect requires well thought-out bilateral
agreements. Direct eﬀects are highly localized; they
concern the immediate borderlands.
Induced border eﬀects are those material installations
that are related to the various border functions: customs
houses, border markers, fences etc. They are fairly sta-
ble, although following defunctionalization they may
disappear or be put to other uses. This process can be
observed in various crossing points on the border
between France and Germany. Induced eﬀects are
highly localized (to be found on the boundary line itself
and at the crossing points), but they may sometimes be
felt in the hinterland when the border police install
roadblocks at some distance from the boundary.
Indirect border eﬀects mainly result from the exis-
tence of the ﬁscal function (see above). They include
commuting, shopping, leisure activities etc. – they rep-
resent the geography of advantages. Indirect eﬀects vary
according to the economic and political situation, i.e. on
factors such as inﬂation, exchange rates, price and tax
policy, quantitative restrictions, sanitary regulations etc.
They, too, are spatially limited in extent, although much
less than the other two eﬀects. Formal border zones for
commuters usually cover a stretch of 10 or 20 km par-
allel to the boundary, but in an epoch of almost
unbounded mobility, such limitations are illusionary.
Problems of classiﬁcation
Boundaries or borders (the two terms will be used as
synonyms in this context) can be classiﬁed according to
various criteria, e.g. their type of separation, their
hierarchical degree of separation, psychological or evo-
lutionary aspects (Leimgruber, 1980, p. 67 f). Foucher
(1988) evokes what he calls ‘‘false dilemmas’’, which can
also be seen as a sort of classiﬁcation: natural vs. arti-
ﬁcial boundaries (p. 9), good vs. bad border lines (p. 10),
arbitrary vs. conventional ways of delimitation (p. 11),
colonial and national boundaries (p. 12), line and zone
(p. 13), unique vs. diverse concepts of boundaries
(p. 15). Morehouse (2004, pp. 23–28) proposes various
perspectives on boundaries that can be seen as barriers,
ﬁlters, expression of nationalism, points of conﬂict,
points of contact and cooperation, or, historically, as
reﬂecting natural law. To these reductionist approaches
she adds the contextual one, representing ‘‘a movement
away from reliance on global, generalizable laws and
toward a focus on material conditions in the real world’’
(ibid., p. 28). Boundary studies therefore have to con-
sider ‘‘social, political, economic, and ecological con-
texts as signiﬁcant factors in any explanation of the
processes of spatializing diﬀerence’’ (ibid.).
The Dutch researcher Van Houtum (1998) takes
another perspective. He discusses four diﬀerent view-
points that are in reality opposing pairs of characteris-
tics. They evoke the image of extremes at the end of
continua (Figure 1). While the ﬁrst of these two pairs
obviously lies outside our considerations (boundaries
are human, social creations, which may under certain
circumstances be deﬁned as following natural markers
or lines), the other three merit attention.
Aﬀective borders reﬂect people’s emotional ties with
a given territory, whereas the functional aspect refers to
the jurisdictional side (Van Houtum, 1998, p. 23). They
correspond to concrete borders, whereas abstract bor-
ders are of a cognitive nature and ‘‘have been mentally
conceived by people’’ (ibid., p. 39).
The idea of the hole in the prison wall is obviously
contained in the last pair and can be related to the
centripetal attitude of the political system (containment,
protection) versus the centrifugal propensity of the
economy (exchange, conquest of markets). Politics with
its centripetal outlook regulates the daily life of its
respective society, and these regulations are valid in the
territory for which a given political system assumes
responsibility. Although the idea of the global village
suggests that borders are open and no longer present
obstacles, the reality is very much diﬀerent. The persis-
tence of the political view thus guarantees the continu-
ation of direct and induced border eﬀects (Figure 2).
Tradition is very strong in this ﬁeld, and even the
European Union has not managed to eradicate this view
within its member countries; rather has it added a fur-
ther centripetal dimension, that of the Union as a whole.
It is true that the nationalist perspective has slightly
receded, due to the eﬀorts of the past 50 years, but the
walls have not been torn down completely, and they are
likely to continue to exist. At the same time, the EU is
busy building new prison walls at its periphery (Leut-
hardt, 1999) where holes will be very small and diﬃcult
abstractconcrete
closedopen
affectivefunctional
artificialnatural
Figure 1. The border continua (after Van Houtum, 1998, p. 13).
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to cross. Worldwide, new walls (material and not) are
constantly being erected, emphasizing the dynamic
nature of boundaries.
The second half of the 20th century has been hailed
as an epoch where borders have almost completely dis-
appeared. However, this is only partially true. It holds
good to some extent for the internal borders of the
European Union, in particular for the Schengen area
with the possibility of free circulation, of which the
population can draw considerable beneﬁts. However,
from the existence of borders results the geography of
advantage, as we can call it. Reducing or suppressing
border control enables people to proﬁt of price and
salary diﬀerences on either side of a political boundary.
From this can be inferred a border advantage model
(Leimgruber, 1999, p. 204), reﬂecting this situation and
demonstrating the persistence of indirect border eﬀects
(Figure 3).
Systematic defunctionalization of boundaries with
direct positive results for the individual customer has
occurred in Europe only. Elsewhere, truly centrifugal
economic exchange is restricted to the macroeconomic
level.1 It usually takes the shape of free trade agreements
between a number of states and is primarily intended for
the national economy. The centrifugal philosophy of the
economy has managed to downgrade the ﬁscal and (in
part) the control function of the boundary. Free trade
has become a sort of magic word of the late 20th cen-
tury, but its beneﬁts tend to disappear in the pockets of
the intermediaries instead of fully trickling down to the
individual customer. The creation of the WTO in the
mid-1990s marked the climax of the international eﬀorts
to liberalize trade and create equal conditions for all
suppliers around the globe – but what about the cus-
tomers?
The diversity of limits and boundaries in Europe
In his manual on political geography, Pounds (1963,
p. 29) has published a map showing the age of the
European state borders. It reveals that most boundaries
are in fact relatively young, that only a few (e.g. between
Spain and Portugal, most of the Pyrenees, the Dutch
border, and nearly the entire Swiss boundary) have
existed unchanged for more than 400 years. Four dec-
ades after his book, Europe’s political map has changed
dramatically: many new state boundaries have been
added after the collapse of the Soviet Union and former
Yugoslavia. This is another witness to the dynamic
nature of boundaries. Pounds’ map furnishes a conti-
nental picture, but at this scale it has to omit the many
internal boundaries that have disappeared when the
modern state system was built in the 19th century.
Following the uniﬁcation of Italy2 and Germany in the
19th century, former state borders have given way to
uniform political systems; the creation of the Swiss
Confederation in 1848 replaced a still very much frag-
mented union of independent states by a federation;
abolishing internal customs and cantonal currencies was
a major achievement that immediately beneﬁted every
single citizen.
The age and persistence of boundaries is one element
when one speaks of their diversity, the degree of sepa-
ration is another. State borders separate political
systems, but these are far from homogeneous. The
Franco-German boundary separates a centralist from a
federalist (decentralized) system; in the former, all
transborder aﬀairs even on the provincial level are dealt
with by the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs in Paris, whereas
in the latter, the individual Bundesla¨nder dispose of
some competence of their own in this ﬁeld. Viewed from
the inside, therefore, the same boundary is not the same
considering transborder relations. To breach a hole is
far easier for the Germans than for the French.
The foundation of the European Economic Com-
munity in 1957 laid the basis for the gradual defunc-
tionalization of European boundaries. This process
reduced the separating role in ﬁelds like national sov-
ereignty, control, state revenue, ideology and military
defence. Within the same continent, we witnessed on the
one side the downgrading of the boundaries, while at the
same time the iron curtain between the two ideological
systems was constructed and reinforced, and ‘‘walls’’
between the members of the eastern bloc were raised.
In this same period, the border eﬀects varied across
Europe. Of the three types of eﬀects (direct, indirect, and
induced), the ﬁrst and the third were reinforced along
the Iron Curtain (doubling of infrastructures, con-
struction of security posts), whereas the second (shop-
ping trips, transborder commuting) was impossible to
realize. Border control and demarcation became very
strong (induced eﬀects), and territorial development
radically changed on either side (direct eﬀect). Trans-
border relations in order to draw advantages of the
border situation (indirect eﬀects) were prohibited. The
Politics
Direct border effects:
infrastructure (national per-
spective), ideology, national 
identity
Induced border effects:
protection, control
Figure 2. Centripetal politics and border eﬀects (based on Leimgruber,
1999, p. 199).
Economy
Indirect border effects The
geography of advantage: sala-
ries, prices, range of goods, 
quality, availability, ...
Figure 3. Centrifugal economyandborder eﬀects (basedonLeimgruber,
1999, p. 199).
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boundaries in Western Europe, on the other hand,
experienced an ambiguous process of defunctionaliza-
tion. There was a strong evolution of indirect border
eﬀects (increase in transborder commuting, shopping
trips, capital ﬂows etc.), but nationalist considerations
continued to dominate in the ﬁeld of direct eﬀects
(parallel infrastructures thanks to centripetal legislation
in education, health services, police). The induced eﬀects
began to fade as border installations were gradually
removed or put to new uses.
Deconstructing the political boundaries has not
automatically conducted to the disappearance of dis-
parities, as a few examples may demonstrate. The Iron
Curtain still lives on to some extent in the mind of the
Germans. Unemployment and job opportunities still
diﬀer between the La¨nder of the former GDR and FRG
(in 2004, for example, unemployment amounted to
9.4% in the former FRG, but to 20.1% in the old
GDR, which gives an average of 11.7% for Germany
as a whole). The linguistic divide continues to charac-
terize Europe, although learning other languages of the
EU has become more popular and the EU actively
encourages language learning: ‘‘Learning one lingua
franca alone is not enough. Every European citizen
should have meaningful communicative competence in
at least two other languages in addition to his or her
mother tongue’’ (EU, 2003, p. 4). The Entente Cordiale
of 1904 has contributed to the downgrading of Anglo-
French diﬀerences, although President de Gaulle’s
refusals in 1963 and 1967 to accept the UK as a
member of the EEC has cast some temporary shade on
this friendship. The argument that Britain was not
mature enough to accept the Community’s discipline
(Rambaud, 2004) was not particularly friendly. The
decision of the UK not to introduce the Euro but keep
the Pound Stirling as national currency illustrates the
persistence of the Channel as a divide inside the Union.
Similarly, the backing of the US intervention in Iraq in
2003 illustrates George Orwell’s geopolitical scenario:
the UK is still part of Oceania, not of Eurasia (Orwell,
1954).
When discussing European boundaries, one often
forgets that the continent is crisscrossed by more than
just political boundaries. The slogan ‘‘Europe of the
Regions’’ points to the existence of dividing lines that go
beyond pure state borders. The internal organization of
the individual countries, whether members of the EU
and EEA or not, is characterized by perimeters of
administrative and/or political signiﬁcance. Europe is a
culturally diverse continent with a considerable range of
languages and religions, various regional and local his-
tories, and many folk traditions. Attitudes towards the
‘‘others’’ are not the same everywhere, and the borders
in the minds are stubborn constructs. All too often,
these borders are more diﬃcult to overcome than those
drawn according to international treaties, and they
impede the free movement of the people because they
are also present in the minds of politicians and civil
servants.
Boundaries – the everyday reality of the Swiss
Switzerland is an island in the sea of the European
Union, and the Swiss border is by deﬁnition one of the
EU’s external boundaries. The association of the country
to the Schengen accord, decided upon by a referendum in
2005, does not change this fact. Popular perception,
however, has been diﬀerent, because of excellent neigh-
bourhood relations border controls were sporadic and
random rather than systematic. As a result, a feeling of
borderlessness had evolved and people tended to forget
the control function of the international boundary. Even
with good neighbours, however, problems may turn up,
as the examples of the German border controls in 2004
and the dispute about the Zurich airport landing-regime
demonstrate.
Border problems with Germany
In March 2004, the German border police suddenly
considered the German-Swiss border as an external
boundary of the EU and stepped up the control of
incoming traﬃc. Where the travellers were usually just
waved through, cars were stopped, the drivers had to
show their papers, and the cars were at times meticu-
lously searched. No explanations for this sudden tight-
ening of measures were given except that it was a routine
measure related to the Schengen treaty. The conse-
quences were disastrous and were felt in diﬀerent
domains: people crossing the border regularly (for work
or for shopping) were exasperated, road traﬃc directed
towards Germany came to a standstill, and long queues
built up on the Swiss motorways and main roads, while
the border police scrutinized the people passing through.
The German border commuters were infuriated about
the additional time they spent on their way home, and so
were the many Belgian and Dutch holidaymakers who
wanted to return home using the German motorways.
Swiss people accustomed to do their shopping in Ger-
man supermarkets reacted to this obstruction to free
travel by refraining from shopping in Germany; sales in
supermarkets and shops immediately dropped by 20%
and more – not to the pleasure of the shop owners. This
incident, which was discussed on high political levels,
demonstrates the degree to which the Swiss border is
geared to free movement.
German-Swiss relations have been restored since, but
a certain malaise remains. It is enhanced by a contention
concerning Zurich airport where, traditionally, most
planes landed from the north (Figure 4), ﬂying only
700 m above ground over numerous settlements on
German territory, less than 20 km away. This landing
regime had been agreed upon in 1984. The populations
in the area concerned had been expressing their dissat-
isfaction for many years, but neither the German
authorities nor the Swiss side (Zurich airport and the
Canton of Zurich) had taken the complaints about the
noise seriously, until Germany denounced the agree-
ment in 2000. In the following year, the German and
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Swiss transport ministers concluded a new bilateral
treaty, which obliged Switzerland to reduce the number
of landings from the north. However, Zurich airport
and the Canton of Zurich refused this agreement, and
the Swiss parliament rejected it in 2003. As a conse-
quence, Germany enforced unilateral measures and
restricted the number of approaches from the north.
Most ﬂights were therefore compelled to land from the
south, approaching over the densely populated Zurich
conurbation (including the ‘‘gold coast’’), a solution the
inhabitants concerned did not appreciate. The planes
land from 6 a.m. onwards; the noise of low-ﬂying air-
planes is admittedly not very pleasant at this time of the
day. Popular protests manage to keep the issue on the
political agenda, and solutions (including an alternative
northern approach or landing from the east) are actively
studied. Opposition from the population in both regions
concerned is strong, but eventually there may be little
chance to turn the tide. The other alternative, landing
from the east, is critical because of the topography – and
because the population concerned has also manifested
its discontent.
The case of Zurich airport may be an individual
example, but it demonstrates to what extent boundaries
can be useful to safeguard the quality of life of a region –
although in fact another region saw its quality of life
curtailed. National legislation and competence in this
case helped the population of a periphery (in Germany)
to override the economic interests of a centre (in Swit-
zerland). National sovereignty can be important when it
helps to defend speciﬁc regional interests and secure
votes for the next elections. It is true that airports inside
a country are confronted with the same issues. The case
of Frankfurt airport has often been quoted, where the
populations had protested against the noise but not
been considered. The example of Zurich airport also
demonstrates that refusing to talk to the neighbour in
the search for a solution does not pay. The current sit-
uation is much worse than it would have been under the
regime of the German-Swiss treaty.
Switzerland is a small countries, densely populated
and with intensive land use. There is little space for large
airports. Basle airport (called EuroAirport) is situated in
France, 3 km from the Swiss border and jointly operated
by the French and the Swiss since its construction in
1946. An international (extraterritorial) road links its
Swiss section to Basle, whereas the French section is
connected to the regular road system. Crossing the
border is only possible on foot, inside the airport (public
area). Basle airport serves the three countries of the
trinational Basle conurbation and represents a tendency
of denationalisation in air traﬃc (Knippenberg and
Markusse, 1999, p. 11). ‘‘Due to the complicated dip-
lomatic structure of the airport, it has three airport
codes: BSL (BaSeL) is the Swiss code, while MLH
(MuLHouse) is the French code and EAP (EuroAir-
Port) is the international code’’ (http://euroairport-
basel-mulhouse-freiburg.iqnaut.net/).
Geneva airport is located in Switzerland but right on
the French border. Although it is a Swiss run institution,
it has a French sector and can therefore be used for
internal transfers by passengers ﬂying between two
French cities via Geneva. Both Basle and Geneva air-
ports have had no problems with the neighbouring
countries whose populations beneﬁt directly from these
two airports.
The Zurich airport issue is not really a boundary
problem but rather of a politico-diplomatic nature. Air
traﬃc is subject to diﬀerent laws and rules from land
transport, as the vertical dimension, the wind situation,
the angles of approaching an airport etc. have to be
taken into consideration. The nationalist feelings that lie
behind the problem demonstrate that talking to each
other and taking the noise problem seriously could be a
step on the way to a solution – arrogance (as practiced
by the Swiss side) is not a good attitude. This also holds
good for relations with the Swiss population concerned
by the new re´gimes.
Shopping on the Swiss-Italian border
Shopping across state borders means to take advantage
of diﬀerences in price levels as well as of the range and
quality of products. Customs regulations usually limit
the quantities to be imported (in particular alcoholic
beverages and tobacco); temporary restrictions may be
imposed in sensitive ﬁelds such as fresh meat, fruit and
vegetables. Shopping patters in border areas are usually
fairly stable, although economic or politico-adminis-
trative changes may occasionally modify or even reverse
them. The upgrading of former internal borders to state
boundaries (as has occurred in former Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union) has transformed
traditional transborder relations into international
interactions. ‘‘In the process, mutual cooperation and
20 km
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proach (new)
’Gold Coast’
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approach
Winterthur
Zürich
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Schaffhausen
Waldshut
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Figure 4. Approaches to Zurich airport.
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help across the formerly soft borderlines have been
replaced by competitiveness between the bordering
states’’ (Barbicˇ, 2004, p. 215).
Shopping patterns are often asymmetric, given the
unequal conditions on either side of the border
(Leimgruber, 1987, pp. 157 ﬀ.; Barbicˇ, 2004, pp. 224 ﬀ.).
However, they are not static. Comparing the contents of
identical shopping baskets has allowed to reveal such
dynamics over the past 25 years on the Swiss-Italian
boundary (Figure 5). Traditionally, many people from
Ticino as well as from the city of Brig in the Valais
would do some of their shopping in Italy (food, alco-
holic beverages, clothing and shoes), and Italian border
commuters would purchase certain items (in particular
petrol, cigarettes, and chocolate) in Switzerland
(Leimgruber, 1987, p. 159). It is true that the diﬀerence
in price levels has diminished slightly, but it used to
favour the Swiss going into Italy. Thus, in 1980, the
prices in Switzerland were 63.7% above those in Italy,
while in 1997 the diﬀerence was still 36.2%. Early in
2004, however, the situation had changed drastically:
Italians in the border zone ﬂocked into the shopping
centres on the Swiss (Ticino) side of the boundary,
places they rarely visited before. According to the
manager of a large supermarket, their number had
increased by about 20% in the ﬁrst three months of
2004. More unusual, Italians not only go for food but
also for clothing – the trend has reversed. When prices
were compared between two shopping centres in Swit-
zerland and Italy it was found that the same goods cost
17% more in the Italian city of Como, compared to the
Swiss town of Chiasso (Swiss TV 10 vor 10 News
magazine, March 15, 2004). There are two reasons for
this diﬀerence. On the one hand, inﬂation in Italy has
been 4%, whereas in Switzerland it oscillated between
)0.1% and 0.2% in the same period. Prices in Italy rose
signiﬁcantly as a consequence of the change from the
Lira to the Euro (obviously shop owners proﬁted from
this move to adjust their prices upwards). A second
reason can be found with the evolution of the exchange
rate, a strong Euro favouring purchases in Switzerland.
This situation, however, will certainly not remain stable.
Economic ﬂuctuations are impossible to predict with
some precision, hence the retail sector in border areas
will remain highly volatile.
Switzerland in Europe
The examples discussed above at some length, demon-
strate the fragility in the context of national boundaries.
As a landlocked state, Switzerland has always depended
on good relations with her neighbour countries, and as an
island in the EU, this is evenmore the case: good relations
with Brussels are as important as with the neighbours. It
is true that Switzerland has tried to overcome the
drawbacks of her geographical situation at an early date
already: as a member of EFTA (1958), she cooperated
closely with seven partner-countries (Austria, Denmark,
Finland [associated member], Iceland, Norway, Sweden,
and the UK) to promote free trade. In 1972, she
concluded a free trade agreement with the EEC, thus
widening the opening between the community and her-
self. The continuing enlargement of the EEC, which
became the EC in 1993, put Switzerland under increased
pressure and, following the accession of Austria in 1995,
the country became an island inside the EU. The attempt
at partially reducing the isolation by joining the treaty on
the European Economic Area (EEA) failed in 1992 when
the Swiss people rejected it by an extremely narrow
majority (50.3% against, 49.7% in favour, with a diﬀer-
ence of only 23,836 votes). The enlargement of the EU in
May 2004 has aggravated the situation by adding more
partners to future negotiations. Unless the country
eventually joins the Union, it will have to coexist through
special treaties and agreements concluded between Berne
and Brussels.
Bilateral contacts had in fact started immediately
after the failure of the EEA-referendum. Formal nego-
tiations started in 1994, the seven agreements were
signed in 1999, and ratiﬁed by a referendum in Swit-
zerland in May 2000. Among the seven issues covered,
three were particularly delicate matters: the free move-
ment of persons, trade in agricultural products, and
public procurement; the four remaining topics were less
controversial (land transport, air transport, research,
and technical barriers to trade). Although nationalist
parties were strictly opposed to the agreement, Swiss
voters approved it with a 67% majority. To fully
appreciate this result, one must remember that immi-
gration and the presence of foreigners has been a con-
troversial issue since the 1960s, and that xenophobia is a
widespread phenomenon.
Currently, about 20% of the resident population in
Switzerland (i.e. 1.4 millions) have a foreign passport
(Table 1), although only about half of them may be true
immigrants whereas the other half have been born in the
country (second and third generation foreigners). The
complicated naturalization policy renders the (statistical)
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41.50
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Chiasso ComoPonte
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Figure 5. Shopping baskets: price variations 1980–2004. Explanations:
In every year, an identical shopping basket was purchased on the Swiss
and on the Italian side of the border. The price (in Swiss Francs) is
indicated inside the column. The ﬁgure in italics shows the price dif-
ference, i.e. the advantage of shopping in Italy (1980 and 1997) or
Switzerland (2004).
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reduction of the numbers of foreigners diﬃcult (Leim-
gruber, 2002). Currently, discussions revolve around
refugees and the asylum legislation, illustrating the
ambiguous attitudes many Swiss cultivate towards the
‘‘Others’’.
This ﬁrst bilateral agreement, named Bilateral Treaty
I, came into force in June 2002. It beneﬁted the Swiss
economy through improved access to goods and service
markets as well as to labour. It also applies to the new
member states of the European Union.3
In June 2001, twelve months before the implemen-
tation of the Bilateral Treaty I, Switzerland and the EU
agreed on a second round of negotiations, which began
in July 2002. Talks this time included ten topics, seven of
which were common concerns and leftovers from the
previous round (services; pensions; processed agricul-
tural products, education, occupational training, youth,
media; statistics; environment). The remaining three
issues fell into two parts: Swiss concerns were increased
cooperation in the ﬁelds of justice, police, asylum and
migration (association to the Schengen/Dublin acquis),
where’s the EU was interested in the taxation of savings
and the ﬁght against fraud. In this latter category ﬁg-
ured the most delicate issue, Swiss banking secrecy.
Negotiations ended in 2004, the Swiss Parliament
approved the treaty, and on June 5, 2005, the Swiss
people also accepted the Schengen part of the agreement
(the only one to be voted upon) with a 54.6% majority.
Currently, only two out of the ten accords are in force
(processed agricultural products, taxation of savings),
the others still await ratiﬁcation by the EU and Swit-
zerland.
Conclusion: On the persistence of boundaries
To break a hole in a prison wall is a risky undertaking,
and nobody knows to what extent it will succeed.
Opening political boundaries to increased mobility and
exchange (of goods, capital, and people) does not
automatically lead to a win–win situation. The People’s
Republic of China has engaged in the delicate balancing
act of opening the country and at the same time main-
taining a substantial degree of control. Switzerland
strives to stay outside the European Union and yet
cooperate as far as possible as a non-member. These
examples (to which others could be added) suggest that
to some extent boundaries are prison walls, and they
prompt the following two questions: Are boundaries
essential to human societies (a necessary evil) or can
(should) they be abolished? Will human coexistence be
easier or more diﬃcult without borders?
The Iron Curtain was to a large extent a material
wall and the countries east of it were prisons – this was
the western perception. As is well known, it was not
completely sealed but had holes in it – man-made holes
in the numerous tunnels dug in Berlin, institutional
holes in the bureaucracy, and ‘‘human’’ holes in the
degree of attention border posts sometimes paid to
people wanting to cross the border. Legal departure was
diﬃcult but not entirely impossible. Without going into
details, Skalnik (1994, p. 391) remarks: ‘‘I found the
’hole’ in the curtain in Romania’’. Communist Yugo-
slavia (situated outside the Soviet realm) seems to have
acted as a sort of channel for escape for many people.
Whether boundaries are prison walls or not is to
some extent also a matter of individual perception and
attitude. People may be proud to declare that they had
never been abroad, although there would be no major
obstacles. Others, on the other hand, will feel an urge to
leave their country and experience the world outside.
Modern mobility has made it possible – both physically
and virtually. However, there is a strong tendency
worldwide to build new walls, more or less visible.
Tourist visa, biometric data in the passport, digital
images and ﬁngerprints taken at the crossing point are
bricks towards a wall that impedes the free mobility
most of us enjoyed in the late 20th century. The EU
seeks to protect its territory from unwanted immigrants,
Israel is building its wall against the Palestinians, the
Korean DMZ remains an almost impermeable barrier,
the US-Mexico boundary is almost an Iron Curtain,4
and so on. In 1999, the mayor of a small Czech town
ordered the construction of a concrete wall between a
Roma quarter and the rest of the city because of noise
and diﬀerent lifestyles – a decision that provoked a
personal intervention by the Czech president Vaclav
Havel. What can be prevented nationally cannot be
stopped once the international boundary is concerned:
Israel does not feel bound by the verdict of the Inter-
national Court of Justice (July 9, 2004) concerning its
wall against Palestine.
We have to be conscious of the ambiguity of borders.
What can be aﬃrmed with certainty is that there will be
no world without boundaries. They are a necessity in
order to organize space, time and society. What is at
stake is the degree to which they ought to separate dif-
ferent areas, periods, and groups. Crossing the Rhine
into Germany, the Karst into Slovenia, or skiing in an
international skiing arena does not mean a change of
landscape, not even of the fundamental culture. The
limit between the middle Ages and the Renaissance is
diﬀuse, and clear-cut lines do not separate social groups
either.
Table 1. Foreign residents in Switzerland.
Year Number % of resident
population
1850 72,000 3.0
1900 383,000 11.6
1910 552,000 14.7
1941 224,000 5.2
1950 285,000 6.0
1970 1,003,000 16.2
1980 920,000 14.5
1990 1,245,000 18.1
2000 1,490,000 20.5
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Are boundaries essential? They are clearly superﬂu-
ous when they deprive humans from interacting with
each other. To keep a child conﬁned at home comes
close to isolate an entire country with its population
from the rest of the world. Boundaries may designate
diﬀerences, but they must not be barriers. Learning
another language signiﬁes to make a hole in the prison
wall of one’s culture, although one does not become a
member of that culture. Shopping and working on the
other side of the border is an indicator of the material
advantage oﬀered by the boundary but also of imma-
terial ties that exist across it. Boundaries are rarely
sharp; they tend to be blurred, indistinct. It is therefore
wrong to be the prisoner of borders.
Prison walls may look solid, but they have (invisible)
holes. Nelson Mandela testiﬁes their permeability when,
in his autobiography, he tells to what extent and by
which means information was smuggled in and out of
the high security prison on Robben Island (Mandela,
1994, pp. 485, 509, 568). Further proof is furnished by
the collection of essays written in the same prison by a
number of inmates in 1976 and 1978 and subsequently
smuggled out (Maharaj, 2001). There is no such thing
such as absolute separation, not even a high security
prison can guarantee it. We cannot be total prisoners of
borders but only partial ones.
Boundaries and prison wall are a relative concept:
‘‘No boundaries, no barriers; none in life, as there are
none in nature. Einstein’s life and his work were so
mutually resonant that we recognize both to have been
carried on together in the service of one grand project –
the fusion into one coherency. There were also no
boundaries or barriers between Einstein’s scientiﬁc and
religious feelings’’ (Holton, 2003, p. 30). ‘‘Prison walls’’
primarily exist in our heads.
Will human coexistence be easier without borders?
Boundaries stand for diversity, and diversity (in political
systems, culture, social organization) is the lifeblood of
humanity, just as biodiversity is essential to the ecosys-
tem. To reduce humans to an amorphous mass in a
borderless world is not only impossible; it is absolutely
undesirable. The many processes in economy and poli-
tics, the information revolution and the ease of travel
(which can be summed up under the term of globaliza-
tion) have brought humans closer together. They have
also increased the power of a few to inﬂuence the life of
many. The divisive role of state borders has been
reduced, but boundaries continue to be one of the
characteristics of the state. It can be contended that
human coexistence owes a lot to the existence of
boundaries, because they allow us to see and recognize
the advantages of diﬀerences and judge for ourselves on
which side of a border life is better. We cannot live in an
unorganized world, hence the ‘‘prison walls’’ must
continue to exist. However, holes in them are essential
for humanity.
Transborder cooperation is therefore an imperative,
and it can be an important element in a peace process
where a boundary is still prone to conﬂict. It is a
demanding task, and policy decisions must consider
many options: taking a truly regional perspective (not
restricted by nationalistic considerations), recognizing
that the two sides complement rather than compete with
each other, allowing for ﬂexibility, making eﬀorts to
understand the speciﬁc situation of borderlands,
employing contextual (or pragmatic) approaches to
problem solving (see Wright and Pavlakovich-Kochi,
2004). It is a creative task, requiring understanding, tact
and sensitivity. As a result, people will discover that
there are indeed beneﬁcial holes in the prison wall.
Notes
1. We refer to legal trade, excluding smuggling which
is practised all over the world and has a very strong
local and regional component, although it has to do
with national legislation. Smugglers have their own
culture and consider their activity as normal labour,
although they may sometimes also have rebelled
against the authorities (Girtler, 1992, p. 193 ﬀ.).
2. The former boundary between the Kingdom of the
Two Sicilies and the Papal State lives on as the
northern limit of theMezzogiorno, the South Italian
assisted region.
3. The free labour mobility clause (to formally include
the ten new member states that had joined the EU in
2004) was submitted to the Swiss voters on Sep-
tember 25, 2005 and accepted by a majority of 56%.
4. Although this boundary is internal to the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), it
obstructs the free movement of Mexicans to the
United States. This demonstrates that free trade
agreements are a macroeconomic tool and do not
necessarily beneﬁt the ordinary people.
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